AMBASSADOR MICHAEL MCFAUL
This article was adopted from testimony delivered on July 7, 2020 to the U.S.
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the
President-elect Joseph R. Biden has an opportunity to forge a bipartisan, sustained grand U.S. strategy for Russia. With decades of experience in foreign affairs, especially transatlantic relations, he knows Russia, he knows Vladimir Putin and, equally important, he knows the region. When I worked at the National Security Council during the Barack Obama administration, I traveled with then-Vice President Biden to Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Russia. Unlike his immediate predecessor, President Biden rightfully will not try to befriend Putin. He and his expert team of foreign policy advisors understand that the central objective in U.S. policy towards Russia today is to contain Putin’s belligerent behavior abroad.
At the same time, the incoming Biden administration offers the U.S. a chance to develop a more predictable pattern of bilateral relations with the Russian government and Russian people, supported by Republicans and Democrats alike. After relations with China, competing with Russia is the second-greatest foreign policy challenge of our time, complicated by the fact that China and Russia today are closer to each other now than they were during the Cold War. To successfully achieve American objectives will require the implementation of a comprehensive, sophisticated and nuanced strategy for containing
Putin’s belligerent actions abroad and simultaneously cooperating with Moscow on a small set of issues of mutual benefit.
After 20 years in power, Putin is unlikely to change his long-held perceptions of the American threat. This summer, he amended the Russian constitution to allow him to rule until 2036. Because Putin will not end his assault on democracy, liberalism and multilateral institutions, American policymakers must articulate a bipartisan, nuanced, long-term grand strategy that is similar in scale and scope to our strategy during the Cold War. We must not
romanticize the merits of containment nor the glory days of confronting the Soviet threat. There are many differences between the Cold War and our current era; some less threatening, others more so. A new strategy must prioritize containment, while selectively pursuing engagement and isolation. Washington must find ways to address the Kremlin’s economic, military and political influence, while working together when truly necessary.
The central pillar of a new, improved policy must be to strengthen ties with our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and repair the damage to these ties of the last four years. Putin seeks to foment division within this alliance, and he has successfully attracted admirers. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán highly regards Putin, as does Matteo Salvini in Italy, Marine Le Pen in France, Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom and
other politicians in nearly every country in NATO. Restoring unity among NATO members, therefore, is critical.
Furthermore, the Biden administration must encourage NATO allies to meet their spending commitments of 2% of GDP and continue to fund and build the European Deterrence Initiative and the “Four Thirties” NATO Readiness Initiative, which established a goal for the alliance to be able to deploy 30 land battalions (roughly 300,000 soldiers), 30 naval combatant ships and 30 air squadrons (approximately 300 aircraft) within 30 days to the eastern-most member states. Enhancing transportation and logistics within NATO also
should be an important goal.
Lifting Sanctions (at the Appropriate Time)
The United States and our allies and partners rightly sanctioned Russian individuals and companies in response to Putin’s annexation of Crimea and military intervention in eastern Ukraine. Unless Putin changes his behavior, these sanctions must remain in place. Despite requiring major diplomatic efforts, sustaining the status quo regarding this sanctions regime should be a top priority. Any premature relaxation would send a terrible signal to Moscow
about NATO disunity. In affirming existing sanctions, the Biden administration must also clearly articulate that sanctions are not aimed to punish the Russian people nor to trigger regime change.
Helping Ukrainian Democracy Succeed
Ukraine is the most important frontline state in a strategy to contain Russia. The Biden administration must continue to provide military assistance and training to the Ukrainian army to strengthen deterrence capabilities. More important, the Biden administration must engage more vigorously with a comprehensive plan to reinvigorate Ukrainian democratic consolidation. By dragging Ukraine into his reelection efforts, President Donald Trump did
enormous damage to U.S.-Ukraine relations. The Trump administration’s indifference to Ukrainian domestic developments regarding economic and democratic reform was equally detrimental. Vigorous bilateral diplomacy, combined with greater engagement and support for Ukrainian civil society, can jumpstart that reform process again. There is no greater gift to Putin than a failed Ukrainian democracy.
Reengaging in Diplomacy in Russia’s Neighborhood
In addition, the Biden administration must return to the diplomatic field in Russia’s neighborhood. Belarus, the Caucasus, Central Asia and other societies threatened by Russian coercion want to see the United States return as a more active player. Our diplomatic absence—especially in regard to the Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh—and our moral voice—especially in Belarus— have been missed over the last four years.
Providing Greater Transparency about Russian Money in the U.S. and the West
Kremlin-connected individuals have leveraged their political connections in Russia for profit and have then invested that money across the United States and Europe, where the rule of law protects their property rights. Mysterious companies and real estate are frequently used as vehicles for this wealth transfer. The Biden administration must devote greater attention to exposing money laundering and to providing greater transparency about such transfers.
Countering Russian Disinformation and Propaganda
The best method for countering disinformation is improved reporting from credible journalists in Russia, Ukraine and other countries in the region. Instead of directly funding these media outlets, the United States should focus on providing short-term training opportunities, fellowships at universities and internships at media organizations. Education and the free flow of information are our strongest tools against Russian propaganda. The United States and other democracies, in partnership with the philanthropic world, should unite to provide more permissive conditions for independent journalism, including when possible, in the Russian language. Funding for investigative journalists, support to locate servers outside of Russia and aid to hide the identities of journalists and their sources would greatly support independent media.
In addition, President Biden should work with the U.S. Congress to draft legislation to make Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) an independent, non-government organization. Historically, RFE/RL has been most effective in providing independent reporting when it had greatest distance from the U.S. government. However, the lines between RFE/RL independence and the U.S. government became blurred during the Trump administration. A permanent firewall should be created between RFE/RL (and other private grantees) and Voice of America (and the U.S. government in general), so that RFE/RL would receive direct appropriations from the U.S. Congress, and its leadership would be appointed by a bipartisan, independent board, rather than by the U.S. Agency for Global Media. The funding mechanism and governance structure of the National Endowment for Democracy in the United States or the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in the United Kingdom could serve as models. A similar restructuring may also be useful for other grantees of the U.S. Agency for Global Media—Radio Free Asia, the Middle East Broadcasting Network and the Open Technology Fund.
In general, it is essential that the United States seek to contain, degrade and counter Putin’s international ideological campaign. Social media algorithms should demote content distributed by the Russian government through its propaganda channels. Such content should also be labeled clearly and displayed alongside information provided by more reliable news organizations. Ultimately, the United States must organize with other democracies to develop a common set of laws and protocols for regulating Russian government-controlled media.
Practicing Selective Engagement
In parallel to an overall strategy of containment, U.S. policymakers need to engage the Kremlin on a small number of mutually beneficial issues, as the U.S. did during the Cold War. Most immediately, the United States and Russia must extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Not only does this treaty prevent a needless arms race, but its comprehensive verification measures also provide valuable information about Russia’s nuclear weapons and modernizing systems. The treaty’s limitations especially serve American national interests today, when Russia is investing heavily in the development of new weapons, while the U.S. is not doing so. Preservation of the inspection regime helps us to keep the peace. Uncertainty about the other side’s capabilities is always destabilizing,
causing military strategists to develop plans based on worst-case scenarios. Intelligence obtained from inspections is invaluable for making accurate assessments. “Don’t trust;
only verify,” should be the new slogan of our Hot Peace era. Without an extension of New START, we will need to spend billions more on deploying additional nuclear weapons of little strategic value and on trying to gather intelligence through more opaque channels. Although U.S. arms control negotiators should also begin discussions with their Chinese and Russian counterparts about a future multilateral treaty, these actions should be sequenced, not linked. After extending New START for five years, American and Russian diplomats must launch a comprehensive agenda of strategic stability talks that include all nuclear weapons—deployed and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic—as well as space and cyber. In parallel, the U.S. and Russia also could engage China, France and the United Kingdom in multilateral discussion about a freeze on all of their nuclear arsenals.
Regarding cooperation, American diplomats at the highest levels should engage with their Russian counterparts to end the war in eastern Ukraine. Washington and Moscow can also cooperate on fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, combating climate change, pursuing nuclear nonproliferation—especially regarding Iran—and negotiating a minimal agreement on limiting cyber-attacks.
In general, the Biden administration should practice more diplomacy with the Russian government. Despite Trump’s obsession with befriending Putin, actual contacts between senior American and Russian officials declined dramatically over the last four years. Biden and Putin will continue to disagree on a range of major issues, as will the U.S. and Russian governments more broadly. But it is diplomatic malpractice to allow disagreements or conflict based on misperceptions of the other side’s intentions. If only as a mechanism
for crisis management and prevention, American and Russian diplomats should engage more often and for substantive issues. In many ways, America’s most important diplomacy occurs with adversaries, not allies.
More diplomatic engagement, however, should never translate into signaling that better relations with Russia is a goal of U.S. diplomacy. During the post-Cold War era, American preside